# **Ensemble Approach to Failure-Resistant Password-Based Key Derivation Functions**

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### Motivation



- PBKDF2[13] (most widespread PBKDF) relies on simple, repeated hash invocations to increase password key derivation time for attackers
- Bitcoin provided a financial incentive to create high throughput, efficient hashing ASICs
- Passwords can now be guessed  $10^6$  to  $10^{10}$  times faster using ASICs than CPUs of similar price
- State-of-the-art PBKDFs (e.g. scrypt[8], argon2[4]) improve by utilizing memory, but are still vulnerable to ASIC attacks [1]

### Goal

Minimize efficiency gains of specialized hardware vs. honest user's device for key derivation

### Properties

- **Resource consumption model** plugins consume user-specified resources (e.g. memory, CPU, disk)
- Failure resistance Hash construct guarantees security as good as strongest hash; failures in resource-consuming plugins limited to a single round
- Optimization for specific platform Plugin and sponge construction designed for anti-pipelining and anti-parallelism

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### Construction

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## **Example Hash Functions**



